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Figure 1: US ethanol production and the blend wall. 
Source: US Energy Information Administration and author’s calculations.
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IF YOU follow news around the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS), you have probably heard about small 
refinery exemptions (SREs) and E15. 
E15 is a small market—just over half 
of one percent of gas stations in the 
United States sell the fuel (RFA 2019). 
Meanwhile, SREs reduced the total RFS 
mandates by over four billion gallons 
from 2016 to 2018 (Irwin 2019). In this 
article, I argue that the battle over E15 
is intricately related to SREs beyond 
the ‘great compromise’ the Trump 
administration is selling to the ethanol 
and oil industries. 
Ethanol demand: A brief history
The original RFS essentially guaranteed 
the conventional ethanol industry a 15 
billion gallon per year market beginning 
 1 I construct my measure of net ethanol production using data from the Energy Information Administration on monthly US ethanol production plus imports 
minus exports. The blend wall estimate is monthly product supplied for finished gasoline reported by the EIA multiplied by 0.10. The measures are admittedly 
crude, and alternative measures of domestic ethanol use would show slightly different results.
from E0 (no ethanol) to E10 nationwide. 
Figure 1 compares monthly ethanol 
production, adjusted for imports and 
exports, to ethanol demand under a 
national 10% ethanol blend.1  
The E0-to-E10 strategy faced 
a serious problem beginning in 
2013/14. In 2013, net monthly ethanol 
production averaged 1.06 billion gallons 
(bgals) per month, while the most 
ethanol that could be blended as E10 
was 1.11 bgals. Ethanol production 
and E10 demand converged in 2014 at 
1.11 bgals and 1.12 bgals per month, 
respectively. Since 2014, the annual 
potential for ethanol in E10 has 
fluctuated between about 14 bgals and 
14.2 bgals. While we have seen some 
months where ethanol production 
exceeded the E10 blend wall, it has 
never been more than 15 million gallons 
above the blend wall in any given 
month, highlighting the limited sales of 
high-blend ethanol fuels to date.
Pouliot and Babcock (2015) argue 
that E85 could bridge the roughly 
800-million-gallon gap between the 
blend wall and the 15 bgal conventional 
mandate. Realities on the ground show 
that: (a) at current prices consumers 
are not willing to buy that much E85; 
(b) the EPA is unwilling to allow 
compliance credit prices to increase 
to the level needed to spur consumer 
demand for E85; and, (c) the market 
for E85 vehicles is declining given the 
phase-out of government subsidies 
for their production (Lade 2018). This 
leaves the ethanol industry in a bit of a 
bind. In the absence of large-scale E85 
in 2015. Almost five years past this 
mark, the industry has yet to realize 
that level of ethanol demand. Among 
the problems contributing to this are 
rigidities in types of ethanol-blended 
fuels that retailers can sell and, absent 
substantial price discounts, lackluster 
demand for high-blend ethanol fuels. 
Before this summer, the US Clean 
Air Act effectively dictated that ethanol 
be sold to US consumers in two blends: 
E10 (10% ethanol) and E85 (51–85% 
ethanol blends). However, to use 
E85, consumers need to own flex-fuel 
vehicles (FFVs) and gasoline stations 
need specialized fueling infrastructure. 
For a variety of reasons, the market 
never really took off, and the primary 
way firms complied with the RFS until 
2013 was through converting gasoline 
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adoption, refiners have complied with 
RFS mandates exceeding the blend wall 
by taking advantage of flexibility in the 
program and purchasing compliance 
credits generated through increased 
biodiesel blending. 
E15 demand: A new way to break the 
blend wall?
The ethanol industry seems to have 
shifted focus from E85 to expanding the 
market for E15 (fuel containing 15% 
ethanol).2  Why would the industry 
lobby so hard to expand market access 
of a lower-blend fuel? Because the 
vehicle market is far greater for E15. 
In 2011, EPA granted a partial waiver 
to E15, approving its use in any model-
year vehicle 2001 or newer (EPA 2011). 
Where FFVs make up around 7% of 
the passenger vehicle market, E15 can 
E15 Demand and Small Refinery Waivers: A 
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2 This is not to say the industry does not still promote E85.
3 Specifically, I use ethanol and RBOB gasoline price data from CME and calculate a weighted average E10 and E15 price series assuming each contains 10% 
and 15% ethanol, respectively. I assume each price is marked up by a $0.015 /gallon transportation cost, a $.27 /gallon retail markup, and a $0.4919/gallon 
sales tax. Estimates do not include RIN prices. The choice is intentional to illustrate the potential E15 price discount as a stand-alone product with no RFS sup-
port.
be used in more than 90% vehicles. 
However, the industry faced another 
obstacle: most retailers were not 
allowed to sell E15 in the summertime. 
Station owners are unlikely to invest 
in infrastructure for products that they 
cannot sell half the year. However, this 
changed in March 2019 when EPA 
finalized actions to allow year-round 
E15 sales (EPA 2019a). 
Small refiner waivers and E15 demand
The ethanol industry now has a 
new means to break the blend wall. 
Even modest E15 adoption could 
substantially expand domestic ethanol 
demand, eroding refiners’ market share. 
The success of E15, however, depends 
crucially on consumers’ willingness 
to pay for the new product. Most 
consumers know that ethanol has lower 
energy content than gasoline, thus E15 
needs to be around 1.7% cheaper than 
E10 to make up for the lost fuel mileage. 
However, we know that E85 consumers 
use rules of thumb (Lia, Pouliot, and 
Babcock 2018), and often do not 
purchase E85 in large quantities unless 
the discount is well below energy parity. 
Further, consumers face conflicting 
information about E15 (Edmunds 
2013). All of this likely increases the 
discount needed for large-scale E15 
adoption. 
E15 price data is relatively scarce. 
To explore where prices stand, I 
constructed my own estimates of retail 
E15 and E10 prices since 2018 using 
data from the Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange and assuming typical mark-
ups and taxes for Minnesota. The top 
panel of figure 2 presents my estimated 
E15 prices and compares them to 
monthly E15 prices reported by the 
Minnesota Department of Commerce. 
The bottom panel shows the E15 price 
discount relative to E10.3  The top figure 
confirms that my constructed estimates 
follow closely to actual retail prices. 
The bottom panel shows the E15 price 
discount is small and has not exceeded 
1.5% since 2018. The discounts are not 
large enough to spur substantial E15 
sales. 
Now we come to the crux of my 
argument. At least in the short run, 
spurring large-scale E15 demand will 
require noticeably lower prices than 
E10. Given market prices over the last 
two years, the only way to realize these 
large E15 discounts is by increasing 
the implicit RFS subsidy for ethanol. 
Enter small refinery waivers. The EPA 
has vastly increased the use of SRE 
provisions since 2017 (EPA 2019b). 
SREs have lowered compliance credit 
prices, decreasing the RFS subsidy 
for ethanol and limiting the discount 
retailers can offer for E15. So long Figure 2. Constructed and actual Minnesota E15 prices.
Sources: Chicago Mercantile Exchange, MN Department of Commerce, and author’s calculations.

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as SREs remain commonplace, as EPA 
indicated they would (EPA 2019c), E15 
price discounts will be low, limiting the 
current and future potential for the E15 
market. 
The battle for market share in a declining 
market
If projections are correct, the liquid 
transportation fuel market is in 
decline. The Department of Energy 
anticipates gasoline use will decline 
from 137 bgals per year to around 
110 bgals by 2030. How much of that 
market will be gasoline versus ethanol 
depends on what fuels are available to 
consumers and the level, or lack thereof, 
of government support for biofuels. 
Assuming support for conventional 
ethanol eventually phases out, E10 and 
E15 will need to stand on their own. As 
we see in figure 1, E15 is just not cheap 
enough to spur large-scale consumer 
adoption. If, however, SREs are removed 
and ethanol subsidies under the RFS 
increase to historical levels, we may 
see some consumers begin to use E15 
regularly. Over time, as the fuel becomes 
less of a novelty, the E15 market could 
expand, eroding gasoline’s market 
share. This is not a situation the fossil 
fuel industry wants to see. Thus, the 
battle over SREs can be cast as a battle 
over long-term market shares, where 
one side wants to ensure this new 
product market remains small, and the 
other wants to see it expand.
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